The University of San Francisco

USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center
Economics

College of Arts and Sciences

2016

Competitive Mothers: Comparing
Competitiveness in Spheres that Matter
Alessandra Cassar
University of San Francisco, acassar@usfca.edu

F Wordofa
Y J. Zhang

Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.usfca.edu/econ
Part of the Cognitive Psychology Commons, Economics Commons, and the Feminist, Gender,
and Sexuality Studies Commons
Recommended Citation
Cassar, A., Wordofa, F., & Zhang, Y. J. (2016). Competing for the benefit of offspring eliminates the gender gap in competitiveness.
Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 113(19), 5201–5205. http://doi.org/10.1073/
pnas.1520235113

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the College of Arts and Sciences at USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson Library |
Geschke Center. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics by an authorized administrator of USF Scholarship: a digital repository @ Gleeson
Library | Geschke Center. For more information, please contact repository@usfca.edu.

Competitive Mothers:
Comparing Competitiveness in Spheres that Matter
Draft date: 9 February 2016
Alessandra Cassar1*, Feven Wordofa2 & Y. Jane Zhang3*
1

University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton St., San Francisco, CA 94117, USA.

2

University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton St., San Francisco, CA 94117, USA.

3

Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay, Hong Kong.

*

To whom correspondence should be addressed:

Alessandra Cassar - University of San Francisco, 2130 Fulton St., San Francisco, CA
94117, USA. Tel: 415-422-5351. Email: acassar@usfca.edu.
Y. Jane Zhang - Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Clear Water Bay,
Hong Kong. Email: janezhang@ust.hk.

Classification:
SOCIAL SCIENCES: Economic Sciences; Psychological and Cognitive Sciences.
Keywords: Female competition; sexual selection; affirmative action.

1|Page

Abstract
Recent advances have highlighted the evolutionary significance of female competition,
with the sexes pursuing different competitive strategies and females reserving their
most intense competitive behaviors for the benefit of offspring (1-3).

Influential

economic experiments using cash incentives, however, have found evidence suggesting
that women have a lower desire to compete than men (4-7). We hypothesize that the
estimated gender differences critically depend on how we elicit them, especially on the
incentives used. We test this hypothesis through an experiment with adults in China
(n=358). Data show that, once the incentives are switched from monetary to childbenefitting, gender differences disappear. This result suggests that female competition
can be just as intense as male competition given the right goals, indicating important
implications for policies designed to promote gender equality.
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Significance Statement
Despite Darwin’s recognition of the importance of intra-sexual competition, the topic
of female competition has been largely ignored. Economists, looking for reasons why
women are rarely found in top jobs, have accumulated experimental evidence
pointing to women’s lower desire to compete than men. Consistent with newer
interdisciplinary hypotheses about female competition, our experimental results show
that women can compete as much as men once we change the experimental reward
medium to something more in line with women’s goal: the benefit of one’s children.
Our results have important policy implications: a change in the workplace incentive
structure could induce more women to enter workplace competitions. Such findings
matter for a broader group of scientists including biologists, anthropologists,
psychologists, economists and sociologists.
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Following pioneering works by Hrdy and Clutton-Brock, significant advances in
evolutionary biology, psychology and anthropology have produced an important body of
knowledge on the occurrence and evolutionary significance of female competition (1-3, 89). Despite Darwin’s recognition of the importance of intra-sexual competition, male-male
and female-female competition for resources and sexual reproduction (10), most
subsequent work has focused on the mechanisms and consequences of male competition.
From an evolutionary perspective, variance in female reproductive outcomes (especially
given the successful spread of monogamous marriage norms which reduces sex differences
in the opportunity for sexual selection (8-9, 11)) implies that men and women have been
subject to similarly intense selection pressures (1, 12). If competitive traits derive from
selection pressures, then men and women should each have evolved competitive traits.
Recently, important studies have laid the foundation for understanding the difference in
competitive strategies pursued by the sexes and, in particular, found that females reserve
their most intense competitive behaviors for the benefit of offspring (3, 9, 12). The goal of
this paper is to contribute new behavioral evidence to the study of the different modalities
of women’s competition.
Economists have long observed that sex differences in behavior exist and have
consistently documented a gender gap in the desire to compete (5, 13). In the standard
experimental design on selection into competitive environments, men and women are given
a series of computational tasks under different payment conditions, and then asked to
choose the preferred payment method for a subsequent task (4). Despite the lack of a
gender difference in performance, when offered the choice to be paid on a tournament
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payment scheme or a non-competitive piece-rate payment scheme, men usually choose
tournament significantly more often than women. Controlling for confidence and risk
aversion does not explain away the gender gap in choosing tournament. Numerous
subsequent studies have replicated this finding, in the lab and in the field, and have
explored possible ways to encourage women to choose tournament, such as affirmative
action or varying the characteristics of the task or of the competition (5, 14-17). Adding to
the more traditional explanations for gender differences in labor market outcomes (i.e.
gender differences in human capital accumulation (18) and gender discrimination (19)), this
finding contributes a more direct behavioral explanation to the puzzle of why women are
scarce in top-ranking professional positions: women simply do not select into competitive
environments as much as men do because they are lacking in competitive behavioral traits.
Despite how pervasive this idea has become, it has not found unequivocal support in labor
market data (20). 1 A better understanding of the mechanism behind gender differences in
competitive behaviour would allow for targeted policy in addressing labor market
inequality.
In light of the evolutionary evidence, we hypothesize that the nature of the reward
used in economic experiments can induce gender differences in behavior by turning on
gender specific tendencies to participate in a given sphere of competition, but these
tendencies are not necessarily indicative of general competitiveness. We propose that
women are not necessarily less competitive than men, especially in those spheres of

1

In particular, the data show that the gender wage gap is smallest not in the least competitive jobs, but in the
jobs with the most flexibility.
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competition that really matter to them. Despite cash being the standard reward medium,2 in
competitive environments it could interact with deep-seated gender differences in mating
strategies and weaken women’s tendency to compete and/or strengthen men’s.
Psychologists have shown that women find cues to resource acquisition such as earning
capacity (here winning a large cash prize) more attractive in a prospective mate than men
do (21). Traits related to ability to successfully compete over such resources do not appear
to be highly ranked by men as desirable female characteristics, which could contribute to
making men more competitive than women over these cash resources. On the contrary,
given the different and more important role that mothers play in infant survival (22), and
the high costs associated with violence (12), females reserve their most intense competitive
behavior to ensure their reproductive success, i.e., the survival and thriving of their
offspring (3, 9, 12). Therefore, we expect that women will be relatively more competitive
for resources that directly benefit one’s offspring than for a cash prize.
From an economic perspective, women’s lower competitive instincts over cash
stakes, which could be used in turn to buy child-benefitting resources, would be consistent
with a relaxation of the hypothesis of perfect rationality in favor of seemingly less rational
yet still predictable behaviors rooted in social norms rather than market norms (23). For
example, emerging evidence showing that tendencies to compete are reversed in matrilineal
and matrilocal societies (24) and that girls in single-sex schools are as competitive as boys
(25) suggests that nurture/culture plays an important role in contributing to the gender
specific competitive tendencies over cash stakes. Nature may play a role as well, as female

2

It satisfies the three principles of non-satiation, salience and dominance (Economics Lab, by Friedman and
Cassar, Routledge, 2004).
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competitiveness over cash seem to vary with hormone levels (26, 27), and post-menopausal
women are found to be more competitive than younger women (28).
To test our hypothesis, we designed an experiment in which subjects perform tasks
and choose between piece-rate and tournament payment schemes (as in the standard
protocol for eliciting competitive preferences) under two reward treatments: cash (the
standard medium to incentivize participants in economic experiments) and a prize intended
to benefit one's child (novel treatment) - a scholastic bookstore voucher with equal face
value as the cash reward corresponding to performance in the experimental task.
The experimental design is within-subject. Each session consisted of six different
rounds: the first four, administered in random order between sessions, were different
treatments of a game designed to elicit a subject’s desire to compete; the last two were a
risk aversion elicitation task and a willingness to pay (WTP) elicitation task. The desire to
compete elicitation task, with reward rules specific to each treatment, required subjects to
add sets of five two-digit numbers, as many as possible in three minutes (such as 78 + 23 +
69 + 35 + 10 =?). The number of correct solutions, our performance measure, was recorded
as the subject’s score. At the end of each round the subjects were notified of their own
performance but not what other subjects scored. At the end, subjects received a 25RMB
show-up fee plus additional payments depending on the performance score of the round
randomly selected for payment, on average an additional 17.64RMB.
Rounds 1 and 2.
Piece-Rate (pr). To estimate a benchmark measure of gender difference in performance,
and replicate standard protocol, we implemented a non-competitive treatment: a piece-rate
payment scheme in which every subject received 2RMB per correct answer.
7|Page

Tournament (tr). Subjects were required to participate in a compulsory tournament in
which the reward was 4RMB for each correct answer, but only if the subject scored higher
than a randomly matched anonymous opponent (another subject in the experiment, of
unknown gender). With ties, winners shared the payment equally.
Rounds 3 and 4.
Choice-Cash (cc). Subjects had to choose under which payment scheme their next
performance should be compensated: piece-rate (2RMB per correct answer) or tournament
(4RMB per correct answer if score higher than the opponent, nothing otherwise).3 The
three treatments described above are identical to the standard protocol in the literature.
Choice-Voucher (cv). Similar to Choice-Cash, this treatment also required subjects to
choose between the two types of compensation schemes. The only difference, giving us our
comparison of interest, was that the compensation reward was not cash, but a bookstore
voucher of equal face value.
While Rounds 3 and 4 always followed Rounds 1 and 2, the treatment order within
the two blocks was randomly assigned to sessions, thus the four treatment order
combinations were pr-tr-cc-cv, tr-pr-cc-cv, pr-tr-cv-cc, and tr-pr-cv-cc. See Table S2 for a
balance check of the counter-balanced design and characteristics of the participants facing
each order combination.
After the first four rounds, subjects were asked to guess their opponent’s score in
the compulsory tournament. The difference between their own score and their guess of
3

As in (4), if a subject choose tournament, her score was compared to the score of her opponent in the
compulsory tournament round, rather than their opponent’s score in Choice-Cash to ensure that participants
choosing the tournament option are competing against the scores of others also performing under the
tournament condition, so to rule out reasons for choosing the piece-rate scheme such as not wanting to impose
negative externality on others or strategic response to beliefs about other participants’ choices.
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their opponent’s score is used to proxy for their confidence in winning the tournament.
Round 5: Risk Tolerance – To estimate a subject’s risk attitude, we administered the
Multiple Price List (MPL) elicitation method with real payoffs (reported in SI 5).
Round 6: Willingness to Pay – To estimate how much each individual valued the voucher,
we used a procedure similar to the previous MPL (reported in SI 5).
Survey Instruments. At the end, subjects were asked to answer demographic and socioeconomic questions, as well as a series of questions about their beliefs (see SI 6).
The sample pool is comprised of 358 parents (173 fathers, 185 mothers) of middle
and high school students recruited through seven educational institutions throughout
Shanghai, China, between June and August of 2012, who participated in 18 experimental
sessions lasting 45-60 minutes each. In addition to written instructions, to ensure
consistency, prevent framing and other uncontrolled biases, instructions were voice
recorded in Mandarin and played back. Solutions were recorded on paper by the
participants and immediately graded by research assistants. Table S1 displays the
participants’ summary characteristics.
The importance placed by Chinese culture on education made it highly likely that
parents would use the scholastic voucher to purchase something for the child, as we
intended. In China, educational textbooks and “learning aids” make up an unusually high
market share of the publishing industry, accounting for 65% of all turnover.4 We further
substantiate our claim by interviewing teachers and parents. Shanghai teachers in focus

4

See Buchinformtaionszentrum’s 2014 report, funded by the German Federal Foreign Office:
http://www.buchmesse.de/images/fbm/dokumente-ua-pdfs/2014/china_buchmarkt_en_2014_44724.pdf . It
further finds that of the top ten Chinese book publishers, seven are in the education sector, including the top
four publishers.
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groups were unanimous in their belief that parents would only use the vouchers to buy
educational books for their children, in particular test preparation books. Parents agreed
with the teachers: we conducted a study with a convenience sample of 72 parents of high
school students around Shanghai (with no overlap with the experimental sample) in which
we handed out 20RMB bookstore vouchers identical to those used in the experiment. When
asked how they would use the voucher, 85% indicated they would use it for their child.
There was no gender difference (mothers: 83%, n=42; fathers: 87%, n=30; p-value of
difference = 0.703).
With respect to performance, i.e. the number of correct answers, women on average
scored significantly higher than men in the compulsory treatments of the first two rounds
(8.14, 7.03, p=0.003 in Piece-Rate; 7.64, 6.66, p=0.009 in Tournament), marginally higher
in Choice-Cash (9.39, 8.67, p=0.069), and higher, but not significantly so, in ChoiceVoucher (9.18, 8.65, p=0.199). See Figure 1-Panel A. Within gender, improvements in
scores from the first two rounds to the next two were statistically significant (p=0.000 male;
p=0.000 female) consistent with learning effects. There were no statistically significant
gender differences in risk tolerance (10.82, 10.26, p=0.528) or in willingness to pay for the
voucher (10.39, 10.72, p=0.682). Men and women were equally underconfident, guessing
that their opponents would answer one more question correctly than they themselves did (1.30, -1.25, p=0.933). See Figure 1-Panel B.
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Figure 1-Panel A. Task performance. Bars represent average number of correct problems solved
by male (blue) and female (red) subjects by treatment. Error bars represent mean +/- SE. Women,
on average, scored significantly higher than men in the two compulsory treatments (8.14, 7.03,
p=0.003 in Piece-Rate; 7.64, 6.66, p=0.009 in Tournament), marginally higher in Choice-Cash
(9.39, 8.67, p=0.069) and not significantly higher in Choice-Voucher (9.18, 8.65, p=0.199).
Figure 1-Panel B. Preferences and beliefs. On average, men are willing to pay 10.26RMB and
women 10.82RMB for a lottery with an expected value of 15RMB (p=0.528), and 10.72RMB and
10.39RMB respectively for a bookstore voucher of 20RMB face value (p=0.682). On average, both
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men and women guessed that their opponent would answer one more question than they did
(p=0.933. Men guessed 7.91 while their average score was 6.66; women guessed 8.92, while their
average score was 7.64).

Our preliminary results are displayed in Figure 2. Under Choice-Cash (cash
treatment), in the voluntary tournament with cash as the prize, the gender difference in
choosing the tournament payment scheme is statistically significant at the 5% level
(tournament entry rate among women and men, respectively: 0.26, 0.36, p=0.043), with
men 9.89 percentage points more likely to enter the tournament, despite scoring lower than
women in the compulsory cash tournament. Under Choice-Voucher (voucher treatment), in
the voluntary tournament with the bookstore voucher as the prize, there are no gender
differences in the tournament entry rate (0.31, 0.31, p=0.978). Compared to the cash
treatment, men reduced their willingness to compete from 0.36 to 0.31 (p=0.131), about the
same amount for which women increased their willingness to compete (from 0.26 to 0.31,
p=0.105, marginally significant).
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Figure 2. Tournament entry decision. Bars display the proportion of men (blue) and
women (red) choosing to enter the tournament under Choice-Cash and Choice-Voucher.
Error bars represent mean +/- SE. Under Choice-Cash, the 10 percentage point gender
difference in tournament entry is significant (men: 0.36, women: 0.26, p=0.043) but it
disappears under Choice-Voucher (men: 0.31, women: 0.31, p=0.978).

Next, we test for gender differences using separate probit regressions for the cash
and voucher treatments, controlling for a set of explanatory variables highlighted in the
literature as possible causes of the gender gap in tournament entry: risk tolerance,
confidence and probability of winning the tournament, as proxied by performance in the
compulsory tournament. See Table 1. The voucher treatment regressors also include the
willingness to pay for the voucher (WTP), to control for the stakes size variation induced
by heterogeneity in individual valuations. In all models, the coefficient on Female is the
one of interest, and can be interpreted as the residual gender difference in willingness to
compete after controlling for these explanatory variables. In the cash treatment, a woman is
about 12 percentage points (SE=0.049) less likely to enter the competition than a man with
13 | P a g e

the same compulsory tournament score, risk tolerance, and confidence. This result is
consistent with existing literature. Once the tournament prize is changed to the childbenefiting voucher, the gender coefficient becomes insignificant and close to zero in all
specifications.
Table&1:&Tournament&Entry&Decision&5&by&Treatment
Dependent6variable:6Tournament6Entry
A.66Choice'Cash6
(1)
(2)
Female

(3)

B.&6Choice'Voucher6
(4)
(5)

-0.099**

-0.122**

0.001

(0.049)

(0.049)

(0.049)

Score

0.014

-0.019

-0.015

(0.050)

(0.050)

0.020**

0.020**

(0.009)

(0.008)

(0.008)

Risk6Tolerance

0.007**

0.005*

0.003

(0.003)

(0.003)

(0.003)

Confidence

0.015**

0.007

0.007

(0.006)

(0.005)

666(in6compulsory6tournament)

Willingness6to6Pay66for6Voucher6

(0.005)

0.008**
(0.003)

Observations
Log6likelihood
Mean6dep6var

358
-218.8
0.307

357
-205.7
0.308

358
-222.4
0.313

357
-212.4
0.314

357
-209.8
0.314

Table 1. Tournament entry decision. Probit regression: dependent variable = 1 if subject chooses
to enter competition, 0 otherwise. Marginal effects reported. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10.

Our main results, shown in Table 2, pool the data from the cash and voucher
treatment to formally test for the significance of the gender-treatment interaction. We take
advantage of the power of our within-subject design by including individual fixed effects,
which allows us to measure the rate by which women, relative to men, are more willing to
compete in the voucher treatment compared to the cash treatment, controlling for all
individual heterogeneity that is constant across treatments, such as performance in the
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compulsory tournament, risk tolerance, confidence, as well as unobserved treatmentconstant individual differences.5 The results in column 1 show that mothers, compared to
fathers, are 10 percentage points (SE =0.045) more likely to compete when the prize is a
voucher for their child, relative to their choices in the cash treatment. Column 2 of Table 2
shows a nearly identical coefficient on the gender-treatment interaction when controlling
for the interactions of treatment with willingness to pay for the voucher, score in the
compulsory tournament, risk tolerance, and confidence. In fact, these interactions terms are
all insignificant, implying that, unlike gender, the effects of these variables on the choice to
compete do not differ across treatments.
The effect of greater female participation in the competition is that women went
from being underrepresented among winners of the cash tournament (45%) to being slightly
over-represented among winners of the voucher tournament (53%), with proportionate
representation implying that 52% of the winners would be women.6 The voucher treatment
eliminated the gender gap in winning the competition. Robustness analysis reported in SI3
rules out alternative interpretations based on mother and father differential selection into
the experiment, the treatment order, or a higher valuation of vouchers by women.

5
6

The results can be equivalently displayed using a first-difference model, as shown in Table S4 in SI.
Women make up 55% of the winners in the compulsory tournament (Tournament).

15 | P a g e

Table&2:&Tournament&Entry&Decision&5&Panel&with&Treatment&Interactions&
Dependent,variable:,Tournament,Entry
(1)
Voucher,Treatment
20.046
Female,×,Voucher,Treatment

(2)
20.050

(0.030)

(0.067)

0.100**

0.101**

(0.045)

(0.046)

Willingness,to,Pay,×,Voucher,Treatment

0.001
(0.003)

Score,×,Voucher,Treatment

0.003
(0.007)

Risk,Tolerance,×,Voucher,Treatment

20.003
(0.003)

Confidence,×,Voucher,Treatment

20.003
(0.004)

Constant

0.307***

0.308***

(0.011)

(0.011)

Control,for,subject,fixed,effects

YES

YES

Observations
Number,of,Subjects

716
358

714
357

Table 2. Tournament Entry Decision – Panel with Treatment Interactions. Linear regressions.
Dependent variable = 1 if subject choses to compete; = 0 if subject choses not to compete. Score
refers to the score in the compulsory tournament. Willingness to Pay refers to the willingness to
pay for the voucher. Note that in column (1) the main effect of Female is absorbed by the subject
fixed effects. Note that in column (2) the main effects of Female, Willingness to Pay, Score, Risk
Tolerance, and Confidence are absorbed by the subject fixed effects. Column (2) also controls for
the interactions of multiple switching behavior in both the willingness to pay and the risk tolerance
instruments with treatment.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10

Unlike an intervention such as affirmative action (16), the voucher treatment does
not change the probability of winning for either men or women conditional on entering the
tournament, which prevents a more qualified man from being passed over in favor of a
woman. Further analysis on the efficiency of child-benefitting incentives (here vouchers) is
described in SI Table S6 and finds that the voucher treatment positively selects for high

16 | P a g e

ability people, male and female, and increases earnings for both males and females. High
ability women, in particular, increased their likelihood of tournament entry by 10
percentage points under the voucher treatment (p-value=0.026), and saw their earnings
increase by 8.5% (p-value=0.086). Men and low ability women are not affected in a
statistically significant way. We conclude that the voucher treatment increases equity
without loss of efficiency.
In conclusion, consistent with recent evolutionary theories of female competition
(1), the experimental results indicate that a child-benefitting reward can trigger an increased
desire in mothers to compete, compared to fathers, above their desire to compete for cash7.
These findings suggest that policy interventions, other than affirmative action, may be
effective in reducing inequality in the labor market: for instance, rewarding professional
achievement with high quality on-site daycare, school vouchers, after school enrichment
programs, tutor allowances, or more flexibility to reduce hours worked, which has been
shown to correlate with lower gender gaps in earnings (20). As policy tools, childbenefitting rewards could induce high ability women to enter more labor market
competitions and earn more, without negative impacts on men and low ability women.

7

Our findings are consistent with the results emerging from the negotiation literature in Psychology,
according to which gender differences in negotiated outcomes are not due to internal traits (lower negotiation
capacity or lower motivation), but to women negotiating economic outcomes simultaneously with seeking
social approval and behaving strategically depending on the potential for backlash occurring in different
contexts (29). According to these studies, women are fully aware of the potential for backlash when their
assertive behavior could be viewed as incongruent with the prevailing gender norms and stereotypes. In
contexts in which backlash is likely to occur (as in self-advocacy situations where negotiation is for oneself),
women are shown to behave less assertively than in contexts in which there does not exist a violation of
prevailing gender stereotypes (as in other-advocacy contexts where negotiations are on behalf of others).
When negotiating on behalf of others, women are found to negotiate more assertively (as much as men) and
achieve better outcomes, since they do not expect incongruity evaluations. Similar results have been found
through incentivized economic experiments where competing in teams leads to a substantial reduction in the
male–female competition gap (30).
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Other desirable properties of such policy tools are discussed in SI 4. Importantly, the
voucher treatment does not change the probability of winning in favor of one gender,
conditional on entering the competition. This is a persistent source of concern with
affirmative action interventions, which could be seen as unfair even if there are no ex-post
adverse efficiency consequences (16). An intervention that preserves the conditional
probability of winning may find more broad based support (31).
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